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vCenter fell, but the door was the remote support tool

This post is a translation of the Spanish original.

3 min read

vCenter fell, but the door was the remote support tool

Two and a half months. That is how long, according to Google, an espionage group was using a vCenter flaw before a patch existed. On 19 November Broadcom published advisory VMSA-2026-0009, which fixes CVE-2026-123890: an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service with a CVSS of 9.8 and no workaround. That same day, Google Threat Intelligence and Mandiant told the other half of the story.

What happened

The flaw lives in vmdird, vCenter's directory service, which listens on TCP port 2012. According to Mandiant's analysis, an attacker with no credentials can obtain the SRP protocol session key over DCE/RPC, because the generated UUIDs are predictable. The result is a session as administrator@vsphere.local. No password.

Google attributes the exploitation, since early September, to ARMORY CASTLE (formerly UNC5221), a group it considers China-linked. With their BONESAW tool they created an SSO administrator account, took the directory database and extracted the key vCenter uses to sign SAML tokens. With that key you can forge your own tokens (Golden SAML), bypass MFA and impersonate anyone you like.

Then came the truly scary part: they enabled SSH through the VAMI API, stole the master key and the PostgreSQL credentials, and switched SSH off again. From there they jumped to the ESXi hosts, mounted the VMFS volumes and copied NTDS and SYSTEM files from the virtualised domain controllers. They didn't need to touch Windows: they had the disk.

Broadcom lists vSphere 7 as affected, even though it left general support in October 2025, and assumes 6.5 and 6.7 are affected too. The ESXi hosts aren't vulnerable, but that's little comfort when whoever controls them is the compromised vCenter.

The part that hits close to home

What made me think the most isn't vCenter. It's the first line of the report: they got in through another zero-day, CVE-2026-102764, in BeyondTrust Remote Support, which Google had already documented in October.

I spend my days providing remote support to thousands of machines, so I know what that kind of tool looks like from the inside. It has to reach everything, it has permissions for everything, and hardly anyone watches it the way they watch a domain controller. It's critical infrastructure disguised as a utility. And here it was the first rung of the ladder.

My position: the vCenter patch is the easy part. The hard part is accepting that the management plane (vCenter, support consoles, appliance admin interfaces) shouldn't be reachable from almost anywhere on the network. Mandiant says it bluntly: you have to limit which machines can reach vCenter ports 443, 2012, 5480 and 22, and the native VAMI firewall can't do that, because anyone with VAMI access can turn it off.

I understand the best argument against it: segmenting management breaks workflows, forces you to set up dedicated admin workstations, and in a mid-sized company nobody has the time. That's true. But compared to rebuilding an entire domain because someone walked off with NTDS from the hypervisor, it seems like a reasonable price to me.

If you have to review your setup, besides patching I would check:

  • Local administrator accounts in vCenter you don't recognise (the report cites a sps-*@vsphere.local pattern).
  • Calls to /rest/appliance/access/ssh in the VAMI logs, even if SSH is off today.
  • Unexpected keys in root's authorized_keys on the ESXi hosts and hidden directories on the VMFS volumes.

And one uncomfortable detail: if they stole the SAML signing key, patching doesn't invalidate it. You'd have to rotate it.

What I take away

Broadcom doesn't mention exploitation in its advisory; that claim comes from Google. I don't care who says it: with no workaround and a 9.8, you patch today. What I'm not sure about is how many organisations know who can reach port 2012 on their vCenter right now. Do you?

Fuentes

David González Lombraña

Apuntes, laboratorio y proyectos de IA, Linux y redes.